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NOTE 
THE DECLINE OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: 
EFFECT OF RECENT SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS ON 
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
LOUIS H. HEILBRON' 
INTRODUCTION 
This note relates how a grand constitutional concept set 
forth in the First Amendment has suffered serious erosion in 
the last twenty years through decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. In particular, two recent decisions have had a 
profound effect on church - state relations by merging, rather 
than separating, church and state. Both cases were five-to-four 
decisions and in the educational field: Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris concerning vouchers and Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School concerning after-class activities in a public ele-
mentary school.' The combined opinions cover almost 200 
• University of California Boalt Hall Law School. Admitted to the California 
Bar Association in 1930. 
1 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Establishment clause cases and comments could fill a 
small library. For an excellent summary of the opposing social and political forces 
joined in the conflict over school. vouchers see Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections 
on the School. Voucher Case, 116 HARv. LAw REV. 163 (analyzing the Zelman case 
opinions in the context of five-to-four decisions and their effect on Supreme Court ju-
risprudence). 
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pages of rationale, argument, and citations. This article at-
tempts to set forth the main points of differences and provides 
some comment with respect to them. The evidence of the ero-
sion will be found in the opinions! 
ANALYSIS 
Zelman involves an Ohio statute that provides scholarship 
aid to families in any school district under state control pursu-
ant to federal court order.3 The only district to accept the pro-
gram was Cleveland, however, whose public schools were per-
forming miserably.' In every grade, Cleveland was among the 
worst in the nation in test evaluations, in the percentage of 
dropout, and in school attendance.s The most adversely af-
fected children were those from minority families living below 
the poverty line.6 
In an attempt to remedy the situation, the Ohio state 
scholarship project allows parents in low-income families to 
choose among several tuition programs.7 Parents may either 
receive payments for tutors if they wish their children to re-
main in public school or select and assign payments up to 
$2,250.00 for tuition to a secular or religious private school. B 
The tuition amounts are determined by the level of financial 
need: Other existing publicly funded schools are available for 
parental choice including community or chartered schools and 
magnet schools. 10 
2 My interest is simply to highlight certain of the contentions in the Supreme 
Court opinions that show the vigor of the debates in the two subject cases and to indi-
cate the views of the dissenters with their emphasis on substantive religious content 
which may yet revive the Establishment Clause in this educational area. 
3 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002). 
4Id. at 645. 
SId. at 644. 
6Id. 
7Id. 
BId. at 645-6. Ninety percent of the amount charged for such assistance up to 
$360.00. For a review of the Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and its inconsisten-
cies, see comment Ashley M. Bell, "God Save This Honorable Court": How Current 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of 
Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1273 (2001). 
9 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002). 
I°Id. at 647. Magnet Schools specialize in teaching methods or subjects like 
foreign language, computers or the arts. 
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During this period, eighty-two percent of the available pri-
vate schools were religious. 1l Ninety-six percent of the low-
income parents chose to send their children to religious 
schools.12 The participating private schools had to agree not to 
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic back-
ground, advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of 
any person or groUp.13 Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for 
the court, held that there was no constitutional violation. lo The 
question presented was whether the government aid to the re-
ligious schools violated the Establishment Clause.15 The schol-
arship law had a clear secular basis: to provide educational as-
sistance for poor children failing in public school. 16 Government 
enhancement or endorsement of religion was not involved, be-
cause the government occupied a neutral position.17 Not only 
did the parents endorse the government checks to the private 
schools, but the choice of school was that of the parents in the 
district; they had the benefit of a variety of options. IS 
The court declared the holding to be in line with decisions 
supporting indirect public aid to religious institutions. 10 
Rehnquist called attention to a number of Supreme Court 
cases, stressing Mueller v. Allen, Witters v. Washington De-
partment of Services for the Blind, and Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills School District.2O In these cases, the aid was directed 
by individual or parental choice where a large class of people 
were entitled to make the choice.21 
In Mueller, the subject Minnesota statute permits parents 
to deduct from state income taxes the costs of tuition, text-
ll[d. 
12 [d. 
13 [d. at 645. 
14 [d. at 644. 
15 [d. 
16 [d. at 649. The principal constitutional question on the validity of vouchers 
has been determined. Many states, however, have constitutional restrictions more 
restrictive than the Establishment Clause in the Constitution. See Sands v. Morongo 
United Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 882 (Cal. 1991). These may be the subject of future 
litigation. 
17 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002). 
18 [d. at 646. 
19 [d. at 649. 
20 [d. 
21 See generally Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Washington 
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
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books, and transportation, regardless of whether their children 
attended public, secular, or religious private schools.22 All tax-
payers were deemed to have the privilege, but the parents of 
children in public schools did not receive tuition money for 
regular sessions.23 Instead, they were given other minor bene-
fits similar to those received by the parents of children enrolled 
in private schools." Naturally, the state paid the teachers, ad-
ministrative and miscellaneous expenses of the public schools.25 
Reviewing Minnesota's program in Mueller as a whole, the 
Court in Zelman found that the selection of the religious 
schools represented numerous private choices available to indi-
vidual parents of school-age children!" No "imprimatur of state 
approval" was found even though the great majority of the 
beneficiaries (ninety-six percent) were parents of children in 
religious schools.27 
In Witters, the court upheld a scholarship program that 
provided tuition aid, under vocational assistance to the blind, 
to a student studying at a religious institution to become a pas-
tor.2B The individual had numerous options to obtain a voca-
tional or professional education at other colleges, but he inde-
pendently chose a religious institution.29 Similarly, in Zobrest, 
an individual selected a religious school for his education.30 He 
was deaf and required a sign-language interpreter to assist him 
in the course of instruction."' Such interpreters were available 
at public expense in all public and private schools.32 This was a 
neutral service with respect to religion, providing assistance to 
a broad class of citizens, some of whom directed government 
aid to religious schools.33 
The Court's position in Zelman is clearly set forth in the 
final paragraph of its opinion: 
22 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983). 
23 Id. at 391. 
" Id. 
25Id. 
26 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002). 
27 Id. at 658. 
28 Witters v. Washington Dep't ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,482 (1986). 
29 Id. at 487-88. 
3{) Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
3' Id. at 3. 
32Id. 
33 Id. at 10. 
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In sum, the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to 
religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of in-
dividuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a 
particular school district. It permits such individuals to exer-
cise genuine choice among options public and private, secular 
and religious. The program is therefore a program of true pri-
vate choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of decisions re-
jecting challenges to similar programs, we hold that the pro-
gram does not offend the Establishment Clause. 34 
221 
Justice O'Connor in a concurrent opinion emphasizes true 
private choices and the neutrality of the provisions of the 
voucher law.3s She refers to a substantial number of situations 
involving independent aid where religious schools have shared 
benefits available to public schools, nonsectarian private 
schools, and charitable institutions:" In particular, she refers 
to real estate and income tax exemptions available to religious 
institutions as well as to charitable programs, including reim-
bursement to parents for transportation costs to and from 
school, whether sectarian or nonsectarian; Medicare funds 
available to religious affiliated hospitals; federal tuition dollars 
spent for tuition at private four year colleges; and federal fund-
ing of social and health programs administered by religious 
affiliated institutions.37 Compared with these public aid pro-
grams, the Ohio program expense represents a drop in the 
bucket. 
Justice O'Connor refers to the three-pronged test to deter-
mine whether a statute passes the requirements of the Estab-
lishment Clause, namely, that it has a secular legislative pur-
pose, that its principal or primary effect is one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion, and it does not foster an excessive 
entanglement with religion. 36 The second and third prongs, she 
holds, rest on the same evidence:" In the case of indirect aid, 
the program passes the test if it is administered in a neutral 
fashion, without differentiation based on religious status of the 
beneficiary or provider of services, and if beneficiaries have a 
34 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002). 
35 [d. at 663-4 
36 [d. at 664. 
37 [d. at 666-7. 
38 [d. at 668, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
39 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 668. 
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genuine choice among religious and non-religious organiza-
tions. Applying the test to the facts in the instant case, she 
finds no primary effect of advancing religion or excessive en-
tanglement.'o 
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, sets forth the 
provocative thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment should be 
less rigidly applied in Establishment Clause cases to state ac-
tion than in other First Amendment cases.41 His position is 
that the Fourteenth Amendment emphasizes equality of treat-
ment." States should be allowed to experiment in ways to pro-
vide equality in public, private, sectarian or non-sectarian 
schools.43 In effect, the subject statute provides equal opportu-
nity for quality education to the poor, especially minority poor, 
and he asserts, has the same objective as Brown v. Board of 
Education." 
The dissenting opinions, to a considerable extent, disre-
gard arguments of the majority as being preoccupied with the 
formal, procedural effects of the case.'5 The majority opinion 
stresses the principle of neutrality in the administration of the 
aid; the idea that choice by the parents makes a substantial 
difference and provides constitutionality in an otherwise un-
constitutional situation.46 If the effect of indirect aid is the 
same as of direct aid, and in such case would be in violation of 
the Establishment Clause, parental choice cannot bridge the 
breach.'7 The dissents dwell on the nature of the religious edu-, 
cation, the claim of religious indoctrination, and the present or 
potential effect of social division resulting from validating the 
Ohio statute.48 
Justice Breyer is deeply concerned about the potential ef-
fect of general government support of religious schools, direct 
or indirect.'9 He believes that "The [First Amendment] Clauses 
4°Id. 
41 Id. at 678-9. This thesis was previously advanced by Justice Harlan. Id. at 
679, citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (concur-
ring). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 667. 
45 Id. at 685. 
46 Id. at 653. 
47 Id. at 664. 
48 Id. at 687. 
49Id. at 717. 
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reflect the Framers' vision of an American nation free of the 
religious strife that had long plagued the nations of Europe."50 
Many of the Court's 20th century Establishment Clause cases 
"focused directly upon social conflict, potentially created when 
government becomes involved in religious education." 5' Thus, 
it was held that the Establishment Clause forbids prayer in 
public, elementary, or secondary schools, Bible reading in class, 
and state funding of religious school teachers. 52 The purpose, 
in part, was to avoid religious divisiveness.53 True, the divi-
siveness factor was not present "in the early years of the Re-
public."'" Students attending public schools were almost en-
tirely Protestants.55 By the mid-19th century, however, immi-
gration changed the religious populations and non-Protestant 
religions, Catholics in particular, began to resist Protestant 
domination.56 In turn Protestants "terrorized Catholics," and 
Catholics sought public assistance for their schools. 57 The 
courts were confronted with two possible solutions to avoid the 
restrictions of the Establishment Clause: 1) give government 
support to all religions on an equal basis or 2) separate them.58 
Diversity made equal-opportunity funding for all religions im-
possible without promoting competition and religious strife:" 
As a result, fairly clear lines of separation between church and 
state had to be drawn, certainly "where primary religious edu-
cation is at issue.""" 
More than fifty-five different religious groups and sub-
groups now exist in the United States."' Equal treatment of 
religions in the primary and secondary classrooms would be 
impossible because of such diversity of beliefs and practices."2 
50 Id. at 718, citing Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Sch.s, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680, 
1692 (1969). 
51 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718. 
52Id. 
53 Id. at 719 
54 Id. at 720 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 720-1. 
58 Id. at 721. 
59 Id. at 722. 
60 Id. at 723. 
61 Id., citing B. Kosmin, E. Mayer, & A. Keysar, GRADUATE CENTER OF THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK, American Religious Identification Survey 12-13 (2001). 
62 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 723. 
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The separation objective is essential.63 General government 
support of religious private education would provoke competi-
tion for public money; "it will tap sectarian religion's capacity 
for discord."64 Moreover, in the attempt to assure fair treat-
ment, government would become unduly involved in rulemak-
ing and intrusion into the religious program concerned.65 
In this light, Justice Breyer further considers the Ohio 
statute. He notes that it provides that no participating school 
"teach hatred of any person or group" on various grounds, in-
cluding religion.66 The state is required to revoke registration 
"if after a hearing," the superintendent finds a violation of the 
voucher program's rules.67 "What kind of public hearing will 
there be in response to claims that one religion or another is 
continuing to teach a view of history that casts members of 
other religions in the worst possible light?"68 In addition, when 
a claim that one religion or another takes a controversial view 
of a topic of great general interest, such as the conflict in the 
Middle East, efforts to respond will "seriously entangle church 
and state" and "promote division among religious groups," par-
ticularly "if a religious group fears unfair treatment at the 
hands of government."69 The Justice continues: school voucher 
programs differ from the neutral kind of government assistance 
given in the form of secular textbooks and computers furnished· 
religious schools.70 The voucher programs "direct financing to a 
core function of the church: the teaching of religious truths to 
young children.'m 
Justice Rehnquist replies to Justice Breyer in a footnote in 
the majority opinion.72 He states that "Breyer would raise the 
invisible specter of 'divisiveness' and 'religious strife' to find the 
program unconstitutional."'3 The court rejected the claim that 
some speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the consti-
63 Id. at 722. 
64 Id. at 715. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 724. 
67Id. 
66 Id. 
69 Id. at 725. 
70 Id. at 727. 
71 Id. at 726. 
72 Id. at 662, n.7. 
73Id. 
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tutionality of educational aid." Such considerations, once occu-
pied the court, were eliminated by the decision in Aguilar v. 
Felton.75 "It is curious indeed to base our interpretation of the 
Constitution on speculation as to the likelihood of a phenome-
non which the parties may create merely by prosecuting a law-
suit.m• 
Justice Stevens finds that a law that authorizes the use of 
public funds to pay for the indoctrination of thousands of 
grammar school children in particular religious faiths is a "law 
respecting an establishment of religion" and violates the first 
amendment.77 He considers irrelevant the "severe educational 
crisis" that confronted the Cleveland City School District, the 
wide ranges of choices that had been made available to stu-
dents within the public school system and the voluntary char-
acter of the private choice to prefer a parochial education over 
an education in the public school system.7S He agrees with his 
fellow dissenters that the Court's decision is "profoundly mis-
guided" and increases the risk of religious strife.79 
Justice Souter traces the history of the relationship of the 
Establishment Clause to education since Everson v. Board of 
Education of Ewing. so The principle was clearly stated: "No tax 
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any re-
ligious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, 
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 
B1 He states that the court "has never in so many words over-
ruled Everson."B2 
In the Cleveland case, the overwhelming amount of the 
voucher money was spent for the support of religious schools, 
paying for students' instruction in secular subjects and in relig-
ion as well, "in schools that can fairly be characterized as 
founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue teaching in all 
subjects with a religious dimension.".83 He then details many of 
74 [d. 
75 [d. 
76 [d., quoting Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985). 
77 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684. 
78 [d. at 684-85. 
79 [d. at 685. 
80 [d. at 686. 
81 [d. at 687 citing Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1,16 (1947). 
82 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687. 
83 [d. 
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the leading cases in the modern era that have led "to doctrinal 
bankruptcy."B4 While Everson espoused the basic principle of no 
tax dollars for religious education, it allowed, with some ten-
sion, the right of free transportation for all children to and from 
schools, including religious schools, as a public service.85 Then 
followed approval of lending textbooks to religious schools for 
teaching secular subjects, characterized as a benefit to parents 
despite dissents that book use may "inevitably tend to the reli-
gious views of the favored sect. "86 
Lemon v. Kurtzman recognized that supplementing sala-
ries for teachers of secular subjects, in a pervasive religious 
atmosphere, would require intensive government monitoring 
resulting in unconstitutional entanglement."7 For a number of 
years following Lemon, any improper diversion of public aid to 
religious purpose was found unconstitutional. In Grand Rapids 
v. Ball, a Michigan school district provided "remedial and en-
richment" support to the core curriculum in mathematics, read-
ing, art, and physical education in non-public schools, particu-
larly religious schools. 88 The parent handbook of a Catholic 
school stated the goal as a "God-oriented environment which 
permeates the total educational program.""" The policy state-
ment in other schools emphasized that the "word of God must 
be an all-pervading force in the educational program.""" The 
court concluded "that the challenged programs have the effect 
of promoting religion. 1191 
Beginning with Mueller v. Allen, the court paid less atten-
tion to the prospect of division. 92 Minnesota tax deductions for 
tuition and other expenses of parents of children attending re-
ligious school were upheld on the basis that the deductions 
were available to all parents.93 The court reasoned that parents 
were making private choices when they sent their children to 
parochial schools instead of to public or private secular 
84 [d. at 688. 
85 [d.at 689. 
86 [d. at 690. 
87 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). 
88 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985). 
89 [d. at 379. 
90 [d. 
91 Id. at 397. 
92 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
93 [d. at 397. 
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schools.94 The opposite result was reached in Committee for 
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 95 This court 
struck down a New York program of tuition grants for poor 
parents and tax deductions for more aflluent ones who sent 
their children to private schools.96 Although only fifteen per-
cent of religious school budgets was furnished by government, 
the aid supported religious uses.97 Though the aid was provided 
through parents, the program did not evade the Establishment 
Clause restriction.98 
Between 1985 and 1997, a series of cases emphasized neu-
trality and private choice. The aid was isolated from the reli-
gious program. Money for a sign-language interpreter in a re-
ligious school, aid to disabled children as the main beneficiaries 
of a religious social association, and use of neutrally available 
public funds to pay for an evangelical magazine, along with 
other student magazines printed by the University of Virginia, 
were approved. Grand Rapids was overruled in Agostini v. 
Felton, which held that remedial education was simply sup-
plemental education to eligible students and devoid of religious 
influence. 99 With respect to the use of vouchers, Justice Souter 
contends that neutrality is more than evenhandedness. 100 
The appropriate question is, "Does the scheme follow a re-
ligious direction?" Choice in Cleveland, with respect to the use 
of vouchers, was narrow. Only ninety percent of $360 in a pub-
lic school or up to $2,250 in private schools, secular and reli-
gious, most of it being directed to religious schools, was spent.IOI 
The private secular schools were not in a position to accommo-
date many voucher children because of a lack of capacity.IOO 
Souter does not consider the existing public schools, in-
cluding charter and magnet schools, as part of the voucher sys-
tem of choice. loa The evidence is that "almost two out of three 
families using vouchers to send their children to religious 
94 Id. at 399. 
95 Comm. for Pub.Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) 
96 [d. at 798. 
97 [d. at 787-88. 
98 [d. at 798. 
99 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997). 
100 [d. at 253. 
101 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 697 (2002). 
102 [d. at 646. 
103 [d. at 647. 
11
Heilbron: Decline of Establishment Clause
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
228 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
schools did not embrace the religion of those schools."IO' They 
sent their children because of the educational opportunity, not 
because they wished their children to be proselytized.lo5 Thus, 
he claims almost ninety-seven percent of voucher money going 
to the religious school simply does not reflect a genuine free-
dom of choice. 106 
With respect to educational content, he points out that 
most of the aid supports the whole religious enterprise, not just 
the secular part.107 A tax to support a religion is against the 
freedom of conscience. lOS Madison thought the Establishment 
Clause was violated by any "authority which can force a citizen 
to contribute three pence ... of his property for the support of 
any ... establishment. moo 
Finally, he contends "an objective of the Establishment 
Clause is to save religion from its own corruption and to pre-
vent efforts to shape beliefs in order to gain political advan-
tage, particularly to compete for public funds.lIO The door of 
government religious regulation is opened. Efforts already are 
underway to raise the value of vouchers.lll If aid goes up, inde-
pendence will come down; perhaps government will hold a veto 
on curriculum.112 So, we end with "doctrinal bankruptcy."113 
Justice Souter's last two lines express a hope that a future 
court will reconsider. lI• 
The Good News Club v. Milford Central School involved 
school children, but under entirely different circumstances. 115 
This case dealt with activities after school on premises made 
104 Id. at 704. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 707. 
107 Id. at 708. 
108 Id. at 711. 
109 Id. 
l1°Id. 
111 Id. at 706. 
112 Id at 715. 
113 Id. at 688. 
114 Id. at 716. 
115 The Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). It has been 
asserted that the Good News decision can be applied in a manner that maintains the 
separation of church and state by opening the after class sessions hours later rather 
than immediately after the close of the regular sessions, thus arguably removing any 
sense of public school endorsement of the religious program. James L. Underwood, 
Applying the Good News Club Decision In a Manner That Maintains the separation of 
Church and State in Our Sch.s, 47 VILL. L. REV. 281 (2002). 
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available by the school district. 116 The same differences in per-
ceptions of what is government neutrality and improper gov-
ernment endorsement mark the majority and dissenting opin-
IOns. 
Milford Elementary School, under New York law, was au-
thorized to adopt policies allowing it to open its building to pub-
lic use."7 In 1992, the school enacted a policy adopting pur-
poses for which its building could be used after school, includ-
ing "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment 
events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the commu-
nity, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be 
opened to the general public." 118 The parties agreed that the 
policy provided for a limited public forum."" 
The Good News Club is a private organization for children 
ages six to twelve supported by an evangelical religious soci-
ety.'20 The Club sought permission to hold immediate af-
ter-school meetings in the school building.12 ' With respect to 
these meetings, the Club advised: 
The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking atten-
dance. As she calls a child's name, if the child recites a Bible 
verse the child receives a treat. Mter attendance, the Club 
sings songs. Next, Club members engage in games that in-
volve, inter alia, learning Bible verses. Ms. Fournier then re-
lates a Bible story and explains how it applies to Club mem-
bers' lives. The Club closes with a prayer. Finally, Ms. 
Fournier distributes treats and the Bible verses for memori-
zation.'22 
The Milford School determined that activities so described 
"were not a discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing, 
development of character and development of morals from a 
religious perspective, but were in fact the equivalent of reli-
ll6 Good News, 533 U.S. at 102. 
ll7 [d. 
ll8 [d. 
ll9 [d. at 106. 
120 [d. at 103. 
121 [d. 
122 [d. 
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gious instruction itself.m23 The Milford Board of Education re-
jected the Club's request for use of the school facilities. I " 
The Club filed an action in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of New York alleging that Mil-
ford's denial violated its free speech rights and its right to 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. l25 The dis-
trict court gave summary judgment in favor of the Milford 
School, determining that the subject matter "is decidedly reli-
gious in nature.m2• Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the dis-
trict court's holding was reversed. 127 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, held that 
the Club was entitled to use the school premises for its pro-
gram. l26 The court declared that the state's restrictions on 
speech are subject to stricter scrutiny in a traditional or open 
forum than in a limited public forum. l29 In this context of a lim-
ited forum, the State must not discriminate against speech on 
the basis of viewpoint. lao To exclude the Club program 
amounted to "viewpoint discrimination."131 Milford was simply 
engaging in discussion of subjects such as child rearing and 
"the teaching of morals and character from a religious stand-
point. ma2 One could use Aesop's Fables to teach children moral 
values or the Boy Scouts could meet "to influence a boy's char-
acter, development and spiritual growth."I33 Any group that 
"promotes the moral and character development of children" 
would be eligible to use the school building and that must in-
clude The Good News Club. I " 
123 [d. at 103-4. 
124 [d. at 104. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. at 104-5. 
127 [d. at 120. 
128 [d. at 102. 
129 [d. at 106. 
lao [d. at 106-7. 
131 [d. at 109. 
132 [d. at 108. 
133 [d. 
134 Full discussions of the Milford case are contained in Leading Cases, 115 
HARVARD L. REv. 396, 397 (2001) and in an essay in James L. Underwood, Applying the 
Good News Club Decision [n a Manner That Maintains the separation of Church and 
State in Our Schools, 47 VILL. L. REV. 281 (2002). Both articles point out that under 
the limited forum doctrine, the right of religious groups to access public facilities for 
extra-curricular meetings has now been recognized in state universities, public secon-
dary schools and now in grade schools, the elementary schools requiring parental con-
sent. As for content, the Harvard article contends that worship often contains moral 
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The opinion cited Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free School District. ISS The school district in that case had 
opened its forum to "social, civic, or recreational use.III36 The 
school district was found to have engaged in viewpoint dis-
crimination when it excluded showing films in the evening on 
school premises that sought to teach moral lessons from a 
Christian perspective.13' The opinion also cited Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, in which the Su-
preme Court overturned the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit decision that denied university funding for 
printing expenses of a student publication that presented a 
Christian viewpoint. 136 Other student organizations, however, 
were entitled to the subsidy for their publications.'39 The publi-
cation challenged Christians "to live, in word and deed, accord-
ing to their faith. III40 The Court in Good News said "We disagree 
that something that is "quintessentially religious" or "decidedly 
religious in nature" cannot also be characterized properly as 
the teaching of morals and character development from a par-
ticular viewpoint. 11141 
The opinion in Good News held that there was no Estab-
lishment Clause violation. I .. "As in Lamb's Chapel, the Club's 
meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the 
school, and open to any student who obtained parental consent, 
not just to Club members.III43 The situation demonstrated "neu-
trality towards religion. I.. The Club had sought "nothing more 
values and, in a relationship between speech and character development, should be on 
the same basis as Bible clubs. It advocates that the Establishment Clause should be 
used as the test for religious speech, particularly that government should not send a 
message that makes either religious adherents or non adherents feel isolated from the 
larger political community and the message is what it is perceived to be by a hypo-
thetical reasonable observer of the community (in the Milford-type case, a child ob-
server in the elementary school.). 
136 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105 (2001), citing Lamb's 
Chapel v. Ctr Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
136 Good News, 533 U.S. at 109. 
137 Id. The forum was open mainly to adults 
138 Id. at 110, citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819 (1995). 
139 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S at 826. 
140 Good News, 533 U.S. at 110. 
141 Id. at 111. 
142 Id. at 112. 
143 Id. at 113. 
144 Id. at 114. 
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than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about 
the same topics as other groupS."l45 
Justice Scalia concurred wholly.146 Regarding free speech, 
he said that the main purpose of the Club is to urge children to 
moral conduct; the fact that additional religious speech, 'to 
trust the Lord Jesus to be their Savior from sin,' does not 
transform the Club's meetings into something different from 
other non-religious activities that teach moral and character 
development. l47 It is error to require sterility of speech that is 
not demanded of other groupS.I46 The Boy Scouts are urged "to 
keep morally straight" and give reasons for doing SO.149 The 
Club should be allowed to urge good moral behavior because it 
emulates Jesus Christ. l50 
On the establishment issue, Justice Scalia found no invalid 
endorsement where religious expression is purely private and 
"occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly 
announced and open to all on equal terms.'''51 Regarding prose-
lytizing he said: "A priest has as much right to proselytize as a 
patriot.'''52 
Justice Breyer joined the decision in part, but considered 
the record was insufficient for a ruling on the Establishment 
Clause. l53 Any evidence showing how a reasonable child would 
understand the school's role, as endorsing or not endorsing a 
religion, was lacking. l54 
Justice Stevens dissented, pointing out that religious 
speech is divided into three categories; 1) moral issues from a 
religious perspective, 2) worship, and 3) proselytizing.155 He 
contends that a limited forum can be declared by a school dis-
trict giving access to public facilities. l56 The schools may prop-
145 [d. 
146 [d. at 120. 
147 [d. at 123. 
148 [d. at 124. 
149 [d. Boy Scouts are asked to emulate past Boy Scout President Gerald Ford 
150 [d. 
151 [d. at 12l. 
152 [d. 
153 [d. at 129. 
154 [d. 
155 [d. at 130. 
156 [d. at 129. 
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erly exclude worship and proselytizing.'57 In this case, the 
third, proselytizing was properly excluded. l158 
Justice Souter gave a vigorous dissent referring to details 
that were not set forth in the other opinions, in part as follows: 
While Good News's program utilizes songs and games, the 
heart of the meeting is the "challenge" and "invitation," which 
are repeated at various times throughout the lesson. During 
the challenge, "saved" children who "already believe in the 
Lord Jesus as their Savior" are challenged to "stop and ask 
God for the strength and the "want" ... to obey Him.' "They 
are instructed that "[iJf you know Jesus as your Savior, you 
need to place God first in your life. And if you don't know Je-
sus as Savior and if you would like to, then we will - we will 
pray with you separately, individually .... And the challenge 
would be, those of you who know Jesus as Savior, you can rely 
on God's strength to obey Him. 159 
On the basis of the foregoing, Souter concluded "it is be-
yond question that Good News intends to use the public school 
premises not for the mere discussion of a subject from a par-
ticular Christian point of view, but for an evangelical service of 
worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of 
Christian conversion.",60 Souter did not believe that there was 
an adequate record for the court to make a ruling on the Estab-
lishment Clause. 161 Since, however, the majority acted on the 
matter, he observed "that the Establishment Clause cases have 
consistently recognized the particular impressionability of 
school children ... and the speech protection required for those 
in elementary grades in the school forum.'''62 There isn't the 
same opportunity that university students and adults have for 
157 [d. at 132. 
158 [d. at 133. 
159 [d. at 137. Justice Ginsberg joined in the dissent. "During the invitation, the 
teacher "invites" the "unsaved" children" to "trust the Lord Jesus to be your Savior 
from sin," and "receiv[eJlhimJ as your Savior from sin." The children are then in-
structed that "[iJfyou believe what God's Word says about your sin and how Jesus died 
and rose again for you, you can have His forever life today. Please bow your heads and 
close your eyes. If you have never believed on the Lord Jesus as your Savior and would 
like to do that, please show me by raising your hand. If you raised your hand to show 
me you want to believe on the Lord Jesus, please meet me so I can show you from God's 
Word how you can receive His everlasting life." 
160 [d. at 138. 
161 [d. at 144-45. 
162 [d. at 142-23. 
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intellectual exchange.'63 He further pointed out that the "tim-
ing and format" of the Good News gatherings may well suggest 
that there is school endorsement of the Club's activities in the 
minds of the young children. 164 
COMMENT 
The founding fathers labored hard to produce the Consti-
tution, but they adjourned without providing for any bill of 
rights. They felt that the basic individual rights of citizens 
were so well understood and exercised by the people of their 
states that it was not necessary to enumerate them by a series 
of negative statements. The states, however, during the ratifi-
cation process, did not agree. They insisted that the new fed-
eral government expressly recognize certain clear prohibitions 
on its authority in order to guarantee the fundamental rights of 
its citizens. It is indicative of the importance ofthe matter that 
the very First Amendment begins with the protection of reli-
gious rights, first by prohibiting any law respecting the estab-
lishment of religion, then assuring the right of the free exercise 
of religion. At the same time, the Amendment guarantees the 
general right of freedom of speech and, as a result, there are 
times when the Establishment Clause and the free speech 
clause have been held in tension. 
Regarding Justice Rehnquist's criticism that Justice 
Breyer's comments are speculation, the prohibition set forth in 
the Establishment Clause may well be characterized as "specu-
lative. m65 There were no diverse religious problems at the time 
of its adoption. When speculation is based on the experience of 
history, it merits special attention and respect. By the 
mid-19th century, people in the United States were engaged in 
religious controversy in the area of education. Indeed, the his-
tory of religious mistrust has been brought forward to the pre-
sent in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Bosnia. Con-
trary to Justice Rehnquist's criticism, Justice Breyer's dissent 
is consistent with the speculative concerns of the Establish-
ment Clause itself. 
163 Id. at 143. 
164 Id. at 144. 
165 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 at n7 (2002). 
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The struggle between form and substance is clearly evi-
dent in the clash between majority and minority opinions in 
both the Zelman and Good News cases. l66 The majority relies 
on procedural neutrality, as supported in recent cases, to vali-
date government aid to religious activity. The parents choose, 
the individual chooses, the government funds or assists, but 
there is no government endorsement of religion. The substan-
tive effect of religious content, however, is disregarded. Teach-
ing an entire curriculum in the context of a religious mission in 
Zelman seems clearly to advance religion. The pervasive reli-
gious ritual and content in Good News is substantially more 
than an expression of a point of view. 
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the court held that government aid 
could be given to a religious organization providing care ser-
vices to pregnant adolescents irrespective of performing the 
services in an environment of religious symbols or of the reli-
gious affiliation of teachers or caregivers.167 A spate of federal 
statutes followed, authorizing aid to sectarian along with secu-
lar organizations. The prevailing sectarian implementation in 
the states is by church-sponsored, affiliated agencies such as 
hospitals, health services, and psychiatric care. The statutes, 
however, carry the restriction that the rendering of the service 
must not violate the Establishment Clause. The intent appears 
to be that sponsorship may be by a religious institution, but the 
service must not be accompanied by religious pressure or prose-
lytization. 
The majority opinions in the Zelman and Good News cases 
are not concerned with any threat to society and religious insti-
tutions posed by the prospects of entanglement.l68 The risks of 
entanglement, when government interferes to protect the pub-
lic purpose, are stated in Justice Douglas'S concurring opinion 
in Lemon: 
The surveillance or supervision of the States needed to police 
grants involved in these cases, as aforementioned, puts a pub-
lic investigator into each classroom and entails a pervasive 
monitoring of these church agencies by the secular authori-
166 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
167 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988). 
166 See supra note 166. 
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ties. Yet, if every day surveillance or supervision does not oc-
cur, the zeal of religious proselytizers promises to carry the 
day and make a shambles of the Establishment Clause. 
Moreover, when people of many faiths are required to con-
tribute money for the propaganda of one faith, the free exer-
cise clause is infringed. 169 
The most recent cases have required little, if any, monitor-
ing. If the religious mission and government support become 
excessively intertwined by reason of school policy and mission, 
the program should be declared unconstitutional. The mission 
itself excludes monitoring. 
Under prevailing law, if proselyzing or a particular reli-
gious emphasis invests the administration of a charitable ser-
vice, will the government monitor, or hearing officers intervene 
and affect the religious practice itself? Does faith-based service 
mean more religious content than faith-sponsored service? 
Leaders of some religious institutions have expressed their con-
cern over the pending faith-based legislation. The proposed 
laws may authorize government departments to promulgate 
rules for the funding of charitable agencies that would ad-
versely affect religious practice or the religion itself. The sec-
tarian concern is that expanded government funding of reli-
gious institutions providing social services will result in the 
unhappy joining of politics and religion. Inevitably a divisive 
competition for public funds and influence will result. 
Still untouched by the view of neutrality are several Estab-
lishment limitations affecting the public schools such as the 
prohibition of school prayers, the reading of Biblical verses be-
fore the start of classes, moments of silence or prayer in the 
classroom, student-led prayer at football games, benedictions 
by clergymen at graduation ceremonies,170 or the posting of the 
Ten Commandments in the classroom or athletic arena. The 
reason for the prohibitions is the divisive effect of such pro-
grams and the embarrassment of children who do not accept 
the prayer. While school prayer is still targeted for legislation 
by some religious groups, it appears to be a long way from pas-
sage or ultimate reconsideration by the Supreme Court. 
169 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1971). 
170 Notwithstanding administrative efforts to require non-secular content or to 
invite pastors of different faiths to perform the service. 
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Also untouched are practices justified as complying with 
the Establishment Clause by long historic custom such as invo-
cations and benedictions at congressional and state legislative 
sessions. The incoming President swearing on the Bible, "so 
help me God," and "In God We Trust" on the coinage are all 
phenomena that, in effect, have become secularized. 
Embodied in American culture are high moral values de-
rived from religious sources. Religious content, however, covers 
much more than strictures for moral behavior. Religions differ 
regarding content, including views on the relations of the indi-
vidual to a Supreme Being or Authority; divine revelation and 
judgment during life and after life; the origin of the world and 
of man; ritual; prayer; and social practices. When government 
funds provide total tuition for a student attending a religious 
school whose religious mission is declared to permeate the cur-
riculum, the government is supporting and advancing what-
ever aspects of religious content are being taught. This may be 
contrary to the government's general educational position. The 
Supreme Court, for example, held that a state law requiring 
public schools to teach "Creation Science," if the theory of evo-
lution is taught, violated the Establishment Clause as imper-
missibly endorsing and advancing religion. 171 The implication 
in Zelman, however, is that public funding of such teaching, or 
of Creation alone, would be supported in a voucher system 
shielded by parental consent. 
The First Amendment provides guarantees protective of 
religion. Free exercise of speech and religion with varying the-
ologies, rituals, and practices has flourished thereunder. The 
United States is the most church-affiliated society in the west-
ern world. The First Amendment, however, begins with the 
prohibition stated in the Establishment Clause. The Supreme 
Court developed a three-pronged test to assure compliance with 
this limitation. This test is becoming less and less difficult to 
meet and the authority of the Establishment Clause is declin-
ing. 
171 Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 579 (1987); Ashley M. Bell, "God Save 
This Horwrable Court"; How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be 
Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1273 (2001) (arguing how current Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be 
reconciled with the secularization of historical religious expressions). 
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Many share Justice Souter's hope that the Court will re-
consider. Reconsideration by a future court will bring the Es-
tablishment Clause out of "doctrinal bankruptcy" to its proper 
level of effectiveness. This will result, in part, from paying ap-
propriate attention to the nature and extent of religious con-
tent when evaluating the constitutionality of government 
grants to religious institutions. 
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